The dynamics of conflict (de)escalation by social movements or political opposition groups have attracted cross-disciplinary interest among social scientists, but there remain several knowledge gaps to be filled. This paper demonstrates how the evolution and resolution of development conflicts on the Spit (Gold Coast) are symptomatic of the evolution of place values and the national coastal management and how, this informs a shift towards coastal protection. The City of Gold Coast is a case in point and no more so than currently (2017) with proposals to build a cruise terminal or/and a casino, and high rise residential towers on its protected coastal strip (the Spit). There is, however, no overriding jurisdiction covering planning law enforcement in maritime areas and, this situation has led to many social and environmental conflicts. Given this preoccupation with the coast, one may expect that Australia would be at the forefront of coastal tourism developments and coastal protection. In the wider Australian context, 85% of the population lives within 50 km of the beach, evidencing popular lifestyle cultural preferences of many Australians. Today, the Gold Coast is one of the most famous tourist cities in Australia and it accommodates more than ten million visitors annually. Largely because of this phenomenon, the pattern of settlement and subsequent development of the city differs from most traditional Australian settlement and development patterns. While many other coastal cities relied on port facilities to develop commercial and naval activities, the City of Gold Coast emerged and grew as a tourism destination. The Gold Coast in Australia is one of these coastal places, which developed through taking advantage of its environmental assets, such as direct access to the sea, a white sandy shoreline, an extensive and naturally protected broadwater and several large accessible rivers. These findings shed light on the important role of nonstate actors in conflict dynamics and present evidence that challenges the notion that diaspora’s involvement prolongs internal conflicts. In fact, foreign states as supporters are not as effective influencers as diaspora. I find that external support from diaspora is positively associated with rebels’ adoption of nonviolent tactics, while support from foreign states is not. The focus here is on diaspora and foreign states as external supporters, and I conduct a large-N analysis with violent group-level data. I expect that different external benefactors will have different effects on the probability of switching to nonviolent tactics.
As internal conflict rarely remains isolated from outside influence, I argue that external supporters affect militant groups’ tactical considerations. Yet, in certain cases, militants adopt nonviolent tactics and desist from violence. Militant groups are usually committed to violent tactics to pursue their goals.
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